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TAXABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL
STATUTES-Prior to 1918, no government, state or federal, had expressly im-
posed a tax on life insurance proceeds. Since that time, Congress]. and the
legislatures of twenty-one states 2 have seen fit, in a variety of ways, to advert
to this type of property in their respective death tax statutes. Congress, the
originator of the idea, has attempted to enlarge and buttress its own enactment
during the past few years.3  While from a legal standpoint this legislation is of
comparatively recent origin, yet the prominent role which insurance plays in the
scheme of modern wealth has given rise, in the few years of the operation of
these enactments, to frequent opportunities for judicial interpretation. It is
the scope of this note to record the breadth of this interpretation and to consider
some of the more troublesome problems arising therefrom.
Where an express statute does not intervene, it is accepted doctrine that
life insurance payable to the insured's estate is subject to the usual inheritance
tax; I however, it is tax exempt where payable to a beneficiary named in the
policy.' Where payable to the estate, the policies represent a claim or chose in
action against the insurance company which, like any other of the decedent's
claims against a solvent party, comprise assets of the estate. But, when third
persons are the beneficiaries the courts reason that the generating source of the
gift is not the death of the insured but a contract right under the policy, and so
the inheritance tax act is not applicable. The doctrine of strictissimi juris is
144 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. Io94g (1928). This provision has been carried
through without change since 1918.
I ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927) § 10218 (4); CAL. GEN. LAWS
(Deering, 1931) Act 8443, § 2; Colo. Laws 1933, c. IO6, §§ 4, 5; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp.
1933) § 1363; Del. Laws 1931, c. 8; FLA. ComsP. LAWS (Supp. 1932) § 1342 (3) (g) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 14389; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 428Ia-5; Me. Laws
1933, c. 148, §2 (b); Miss. CODE ANN. (930) § 5069 (e) ; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, Supp.
1927) § 10377.1 (7); N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) § 208-537, p. 1829 (continued in
N. J. Laws 1931, c. 3o3) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 7880 (II) ; N. D. Laws 1933,
c. 251, § 2 (8) ; Okla. Laws 1933, c. 141, § I (3) (4) ; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 26, § T; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 72, § 2301 (d) ; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) § 126ia (4) ;
WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 11201-1; Wis. STAT. (1931) c. 72.01 (7) ; WYG.
Coe. STAT. ANN. (1931) c. 115, art. 1201.
In 1921, Iowa (Acts 1921, c. 38, § 17) enacted a provision taxing proceeds of life insur-
ance policies payable to designated beneficiaries in excess of $4o,ooo. But this provision was
repealed at the same session of the legislature about one month after it became effective.
(Acts 1921, c. 164, § 4.)
'kBy including in the Act of 1924, and continuing in successive acts up to the present
time, a retroactive clause imposing a tax on insurance taken out before or after effective
date of Act. 44 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1094h (1928).
' Knoedler's Est., 14o N. Y. 377, 35 N. E. 6oi (1893) ; Murphy's Est., 21 Pa. Super. 384
(19o2) ; Stark's Est., 43 Lanc. 417 (Pa. 1933) ; cf. Myers' Est., 309 Pa. 581, 164 Atl. 611
(1933). See Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 346, 381; 2 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) § 349.
The Maine statute, supra note 2, taxes insurance payable to the insured's estate, except,
if insured dies testate, "such part thereof as is bequeathed to a widow, or widower, or issue,
or if intestate, such part thereof as descends under" provisions of intestate law regarding
disposal of life insurance.
The North Dakota statute, supra note 2, provides that "all proceeds from life insurance
policies not in excess of $2o,0o0 shall be exempt from taxation".
Tyler v. Treasurer, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 3o0 (1917) ; Vogel's Est., I Pa. C. C. 352
(1886) ; Succession, of Hedden, 146 So. 732 (La. App. I932), re-'g 140 So. 851 (La. App.




stretched to its fullest when the courts construe as impertinent the ordinary
provision which subjects to tax a testamentary gift of personal property." How-
ever, where the circumstances reflect a flagrant attempt to evade an otherwise
taxable transfer, the courts are not hesitant to abandon the doctrine that a taxing
statute must be strictly construed against the government.
7
The beneficiary is generally treated as having only a contingent interest
where the insured reserves in the policy the right, until death, to change the
beneficiary." Where such a right in the insured is wanting or has been expressly
disclaimed, the beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy.9 Yet, he is exempt
from taxation in both cases. It is obvious that in the latter situation the bene-
ficiary succeeds to no rights on the death of the insured, and the proceeds should
not be subject to tax. But the case is much stronger for the government if the
insured may at any moment before his death deprive the beneficiary of any
chance to acquire the proceeds. The termination by death of a similar right
has been the subject of tax by the states in other types of property.10 More-
over, if an insurance policy payable to an insured's estate is an ordinary chose
in action, its taxable status should not be altered where the recipient is a third
party. But courts are impervious to this argument. It is for the legislature,
they reason, explicitly to subject to a tax insurance payable to a designated
third person.-
Among those states which have revised their statutes to make express
reference to life insurance, eleven' 2 have retained the judicial exemption of
0 See Tyler v. Treasurer, supra note 5, where statute taxed "all property . . . passing
• by gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death". Insured had
reserved the right to change the beneficiary. The court held that if the proceeds of the policy
were a "gift", it took effect in possession or enjoyment at once. See also State Board of
Tax Comm'rs v. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216, 49 N. E. 14 (1898), where the court held there could
be no tax because the statute had not provided a regulation for evaluating insurance policies.
But see the dissenting opinion.
I Matter of Einstein, 114 Misc. 452, 186 N. Y. Supp. 931 (I921) (Insured, 68 years old
and under constant care of physician, assigned policies three days before his death. Held,
that transfer was in contemplation of death and thus taxable). However, a mere change of
beneficiary or assignment of a policy is not a transfer in contemplation of death. Matter of
Voorhees, 2oo App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1922).
8 RIcHARas, LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) § 333; Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest
in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 343, 358. Some courts, however, hold such
interest to be vested. Indiana National Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 18o Ind. 9, IOI N. E. 289
(1913) ; Neary v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 Conn. 488, 103 Atl. 661 (igi8) ; Tyler v.
Treasurer, supra note 5.
1 RicHRuDs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 328; Vance, supra note 8.
"0 Where the donee of a power of appointment fails to appoint, and by the terms of the
power a designated beneficiary is to take in default of appointment, such failure to appoint
is taxable on the donee's death. Minot v. Treasurer, 2o7 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911) ;
Manning v. Board of Tax Com'rs, 46 R. I. 400, 127 At. 865 (1925). Contra: Matter of
Slosson, 216 N. Y. 79, IIO N. E. 166 (1915). See Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 39,
44-45.
2In Haedrich's Est., 134 Misc. 741, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1928), aff'd, 23o App. Div.
763, 243 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1930), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 6o8, 177 N. E. 16o (ig3i), the court held
that life insurance is not a chose in action, but is rather sui generis. See (1929) 43 H.Aiv.
L. REv. 322.
1 California (includes accident policies), Connecticut (includes accident policies), Dela-
ware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon (but the exemptions "shall not include
any investment policy issued by a life insurance company which does not include in the policy
the element of life insurance"), Pennsylvania, Washington (the exemption is allowed "so
long as the state collects for the general fund, a tax on the premiums paid for such life in-
surance"), and Wyoming. See citations, supra note 2.
The statutes of Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming
also exempt life insurance proceeds when payable to beneficiaries through trustees. The
New Jersey statute was passed because of the rule enunciated in Fagan v. Bugbee, 1O5 N. I.
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proceeds payable to a beneficiary named in the policy. The other states,'8 except
Wisconsin,"4 tax proceeds in excess of specified amounts. However, several 1"
of these states condition the tax on the retention by the insured of the right to
change the beneficiary.
In the states which expressly exempt insurance payable to a designated
third party, a tax is imposed under the ordinary provision of the inheritance
tax statute, where the policy fails to name a beneficiary and the insured sup-
plies one in his will.' Also, an irrevocable assignment of the policy by the
insured to another party, which ordinarily is not taxable in any state, will be
subject to a tax if the assignment was made in contemplation of death." Where
a revocable assignment is made, not in contemplation of death, it is taxable in
those states which tax a policy reserving the right to change the beneficiary.'
A designation in the policy that the proceeds are payable to the insured's estate
if the beneficiary predeceases the insured will not give rise to a tax.' 9
The use of the trust device to distribute the proceeds will not render taxable
what is otherwise exempt.20 Nor will the fact that the policy provides for an
L. 85, 143 Atl. 807 (1928), where the court held there was a "transfer", on which a tax
could be imposed, when the trustee distributed the proceeds to the beneficiaries.
The Kentucky statute makes no reference to proceeds payable to beneficiaries through
trustees, but the Attorney General of the state has ruled that they are exempt. Op. ATT'y
GEN. no. 42-1 (1928).
The Arkansas statute is peculiar. It taxes proceeds of life insurance policies on death
of the insured which "by the terms thereof, by operation of law, or by the will of the in-
sured, inure to the benefit of any person or persons other than the direct descendants or as-
cendants, or the widow of the insured, in the nature of a gift, bequest or devise, not based
upon the valuable consideration passing from said beneficiaries to the insured".
'Arkansas, supra note 12, Colorado (taxable in excess of $75,000 if paid directly or
through trustees), Florida (taxable in excess of $40,000), Mississippi (taxable in excess of
$2o,ooo), Montana (taxable in excess of $50,000), North Carolina (taxable in excess of
$4o,ooo, but such exemption applies only to certain beneficiaries specified in the act [a recent
amendment reduced the exemption to $2o,ooo. See PPENTIcE-HALL, Executive Sheet, 2012]),
North Dakota ("all proceeds from life insurance policies not in excess of $20,000 shall be
exempt from taxation"), Oklahoma (taxable in excess of $20,000 if payable directly or
through trustee), Tennessee (exemption of S4o,ooo to enumerated beneficiaries; this section
includes proceeds of policies known as "paid up" or "investment" or "annuity" contracts or
"similar types or forms of policies, the surrender value of which was subject to control of
decedent prior to death"). For citations, see supra note 2.
'1 The Wisconsin statute (supra note 2) is the most exacting of all. It taxes life insur-
ance proceeds payable to estate or to designated beneficiary. "Such insurance, except that
returnable for income taxation, shall be taxable irrespective of the fact that insurance pre-
miums on any policy may have been paid by some person other than the insured, if the pay-
ment of such premiums was made out of funds or property contributed by the insured for
such payment, or out of the income accruing from a principal provided by the insured for
such payment, whether such principal was donated in trust or otherwise."
' Colorado (also the right to receive the cash surrender value), Oklahoma ("directly or
indirectly"). See citations, supra note 2.
" Myers' Est., supra note 4.
" Matter of Einstein, supra note 7; cf. Parson's Est., 117 App. Div. 321, lO2 N. Y. Supp.
168 (907), where policies were payable to insured's estate but had been assigned to his wife.
However, the policies remained in the possession of the insured. The court held that the pol-
icies were absolutely assigned (and so not taxable), but it intimated that the holding might
be otherwise if someone had disputed the wife's right to the proceeds.
" See State v. Cain, 162 Tenn. 213, 215, 36 S. W. (2d) 82, 83 (2931), where the court
said that the tax is based on the right to "acquire", and if the beneficiary has not a vested
right to the proceeds, a tax may be imposed; see also Will of Allis, 174 Wis. 527, 184 N. W.
381 (I92I), (2921) i Wis. L. REv. 313.
"Parson's Est., supra note 17; see Pierson, Inheritance Tax Laws and Insurance (1925)
ii A. B. A. J. 722.
" Haedrich's Est., supra note ii (court said public policy favors insurance trusts to pre-
vent waste and extravagance) ; Marshall's Est., 179 Minn. 233, 228 N. W. 92o (293o).
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annuity alter its taxable status.2 1 However, where an annuity is employed chiefly
to avoid testamentary disposition, courts will apply the rule commonly applied
to tentative trusts and will subject the proceeds to the normal inhtritance tax.
22
Accident insurance payable to the insured's estate 23 and insurance to pay the
decedent's taxes 24 are subject to tax.
Many problems in this field are common to both the federal and the state
statutes, and inasmuch as the greater amount of case law, not to mention the
Treasury Regulations, has been built up through interpretation of the Federal
Act, the remainder of this note will be devoted to a consideration of that statute.
The applicable provision enacted by Congress reads:
" . .the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated-
"(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insur-
ance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life." 25
Subsection (h), immediately following, taxes all transfers whether made
prior or subsequent to the effective date of the Act.
The first question which the provision gives rise to is, did Congress intend
that the taxing provisions applicable to life insurance proceeds be embodied
solely in this subsection, to the exclusion of the remaining subsections of the
Act? From settled theories of statutory construction the answer appears ob-
vious; that by express reference to life insurance in subsection (g), and by a
total want of such reference in the remainder of the Act, Congress intended
that the one subsection be alone applicable. But questions have been raised.
Dictum in one case,2 6 an inference gleaned from language used in another case,2
and the arguments of a commentator,25 add some substance to the doubt. It
' Wilson's Est., 143 Misc. 742, 257 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1931) (Joint annuity taken out by
H and W, in 1928, in which both contributed to payment of the single premium. The insur-
ance company agreed to pay an annuity jointly, and on death of one, to the survivor. H died
in 1929. State contended that proceeds should be taxed under a provision taxing transfers of
jointly-owned property to the survivor. Held, not taxable. The contract was absolute when
made. Also, it was not a transfer in contemplation of death).
"State ex rel. Thornton v. Probate Court, 186 Minn. 351, 243 N. W. 389 (1932) (For a
lump sum paid to insurance company, latter guaranteed fixed income and agreed to refund
upon notice the lump sum paid in, and to pay to appointed beneficiaries said sum upon annui-
tant's death. Held, that it was taxable. Such contracts are virtually bank deposits. "The
law will look behind the name of contracts and ascertain their scope and purposes to deter-
mine whether or not they come within the operation of the succession tax") ; cf. Wilson's
Est., supra note 21.
I Stark's Est., supra note 4.
21 N. Y. Transfer Tax Reg. (1925 ed.) art. 62; II1. Inher. Tax Reg. (1925 ed.) art. 21.
Contra: Ohio (Op. Ar'Y GEN. 564, 1921) (Attorney General saying such proceeds do not
become part of insured's estate) ; the Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts has also ruled
that such proceeds are not taxable. See Handy, Subjection of Life Insurance to Death Tax-
ation (1926) 25 ILL. L. REv. 777, 779.
2544STAT.71 (1926),26U. S. C. A. § 1O94 (1928).
-, Heiner v. Grandin, 44 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o), aff'd, 56 F. (2d) lO82 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1932), certiorari denied, 286 U. S. 561, 52 Sup. Ct. 643 (1932) (Court said Congress
did not intend to make a distinction between trusts and policies of insurance where in both
there is reserved the right to change the beneficiary; that the same section of the Act taxes
both).
Wilson v. Crooks, 52 F. (2d) 692 (W. D. Mo. 1931).
Oppenheimer, Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies Under the Federal Estate Tax
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 724, 736-737.
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might be added that insurance has already been taxed as a transfer in con-
templation of death; 29 but this has been only where the proximity of the
insured's death to his transfer is so pronounced as to give a distinct testamentary
color to the gift. Moreover, it is clearly settled that the mere designation of a
beneficiary in a policy is not per se a transfer in contemplation of death.3"
A glance at Congressional proceedings will attest the exclusiveness of the
subsection. 31 In accord are the rulings of the Treasury Department. 3 2  Iore-
over, reason supports this conclusion.33 It might well be asked why subsection
(g) was inserted as late as 1918 if the other subsections applied. If there is a
genuine doubt it should be settled either by the courts or by Congress without
delay. Otherwise, a taxpayer may be deprived of the $40,000 exemption
allowed by subsection (g), as well as any total exemption which might result
from its construction, if another subsection is applicable. In addition, taxpayers
should be apprised of the provisions of the law which are applicable to them in
given situations.
Under the Federal Act, the proceeds of all policies on the insured's life
payable to his estate are taxable.3" This includes policies taken out by the
insured prior to the effective date of the statute without the application of the
retroactive clause, subsection (h).35 It also includes insurance payable to a
third person to be applied indirectly to the use of the insured's estate.36 Acci-
dent and health insurance are not exempt; 31 nor are the proceeds of policies
taken out for the express purpose of defraying charges and taxes on the insured's
estate.38 However, an exception is made in the case of a pension fund, arising
from compulsory contributions by the deceased, in which no vested right has
accrued.39
The Supreme Court in Lewellyn v. Frick 40 held that subsection (g) did
not subject to taxation policies payable to a beneficiary if taken out prior to the
effective date of the Act, even where the insured had reserved the right to
change the beneficiary. But this case was overruled,4 ' in terms but not in words,
Iglehart v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. no. 139 (933) (decedent was 74 years old and
had been suffering from a stroke for eleven years, when he took out a single premium pol-
icy) ; see Gaither v. Miles, 268 Fed. 692 (D. Md. 192o).
o Matter of Voorhees, supra note 7; Parson's Est., supra note 17; Tyler v. Treasurer,
supra note 5; see Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 738-9.
" Committee on Ways and Means (Report 767, p. 22).
'V-i CumT. BULL. 3,5; MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK (0932) 758; UNrrED
STATEs TAX GUIDE (1933) § 385a.
'The Revenue Act, 44 STAT. 79 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1114 (1928), expressly pro-
vides that the executor of the insured's estate may recover from the beneficiaries of the pro-
ceeds the amount of the tax paid thereon. Inasmuch as this provision applies only to insur-
ance, it might well be argued that Congress intended the insurance clause to be separate and
distinct from the rest of the Revenue Act.
I U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 26; Mimnaugh v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 411 (1928) ; see
Jones v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 441, 443 (I93O), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 6th,
1932) ; Appeal of Lucky, 2 B. T. A. 1268 (1925).
' Mimnaugh v. United States, supra note 34.
'Morton v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 236 (I931); see Surrey and Aronson, Inter
Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 1332, 1362.
'Ackerman v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 635 (1929) (accident insurance); Gray's Est.
v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. no. 41 (1933) (health insurance).
' U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 26.
Hulbert's Est. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 818 (1928).
'0268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. 487 (925).
" In Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 333, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 127
(1929), Mr. Justice Stone, in the opinion for the Court, said the question was only "mooted"
in Lewellyn v. Frick. In Liebes v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 870, 873 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933),
the court intimated that the Chase case overruled Lewellyn v. Frick. Buffington, J., dissent-
ing in Heiner v. Grandin, supra note 26, refused to follow Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.,
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a few years later in Chase National Bank v. United States.
42  Although in the
latter case the policies had been taken out subsequent to the effective date of the
Revenue Act, the Court expressly held that the termination by death of a legal
interest in the insured which could affect the disposition of the proceeds could
be made the subject of a transfer tax. The right to change the beneficiary is
such a legal interest. The Chase case is the most recent case on estate taxation
of life insurance to come from the Supreme Court, and its principle has found
ready application by the inferior federal courts.
42
Occasionally, the question arises whether the insured in fact had reserved
the right to change the beneficiary. It is the prevailing view that, where the
policy is silent as to the right to change the beneficiary, the insured has no such
right and the beneficiary's interest in the policy is vested.
44 However, the
Board of Tax Appeals at times has overlooked this settled rule and has imposed
a tax where the absence of the right to change the beneficiary (and other rights
hereafter to be considered) would defeat the tax.
45 In a more recent case, the
same court respected the common law rule, expressly holding that the right to
change the beneficiary must be reserved formally before such right can be
subject to tax. 6
There are other rights which the insured may reserve. The most common
are the right to borrow on the policy and pledge it as security for the loan, and
the right to surrender the policy and obtain its cash value, both without the
consent of the beneficiary. Both of these rights are usually incidental to the right
to change the beneficiary, 47 but either may be reserved in the insured even where
the right to change the beneficiary has been waived.
4 8 Under the doctrine of
the Chase case the reservation of either of these rights, enduring until the
insured's death, would subject the policy to a tax as a part of the decedent's
gross estate.49  While neither one gives the same degree of control over the
entire proceeds as does the right to change the beneficiary, yet, by borrowing,
the insured may materially reduce the amount payable to the beneficiary, or,
by obtaining the cash surrender value, he may entirely defeat the provisions of
the policy. In case of the insured's bankruptcy, the reservation of either of
these rights constitutes assets in the hands of the trustee6
0 The fact that by
the insured's death the beneficiary acquires only the difference between the cash
surrender or loan value and the face amount of the policy will not reduce the
278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (929) which involved revocable trusts, but on which the
Court in the Chase case relied heavily, until the Court expressly overruled Lewellyn v.
Frick.
Supra note 41.
* Iglehart v. Commissioner, supra note 29; Ballard v. Helburn, 333 CCH § 9338 (W
D. Ky. 1933) ; Cook v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) ; Willis' Est. v.
Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. no. 29 (1933). See Newman v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. no.
14 (1933), for a complete citation of cases in which the principle enunciated in the Chase
case has been followed.
a Brown v. Powell, 130 Miss. 496, 94 So. 457 (1923) ; 4 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON IN SURANCE
(2d ed. 1927) 3775; RIcHARDS, op. cit. supra note 8, § 328; see Ballard v. Helburn, supra note
43; cf. Vance, supra note 8, at 355.
sDann v. Commissioner, 2o B. T. A. 42 (193o); Latty v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A.
1250 (93) (did not appear whether insured could have changed the beneficiary); cf.
Wyeth v. Crooks, 33 F. (2d) ioi8 (W. D. Mo. 1928).
"0 Reed v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 166 (ig3i).
a RxcHARs, op. cit. supra note 8, § 328.
's If the insured so provides in his contract of insurance.
, Sampson v. United States, I F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1932) ; Ballard v. Helburn, supra
note 43; Ballinger v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 1312 (1931) ; cf. Levy's Est. v. Comnnis-
sioner, 65 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
I Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917).
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amount (excluding the allowance for the $40,000 exemption) 51 to be included
in the gross estate. Moreover, it is not subject to the constitutional arguments
that a tax in such a case is direct and so invalid because it is not apportioned, or
that there is a deprivation of property without due process within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.
52
A situation may possibly arise in which there is an absence of any of these
rights, the policy being payable to a designated beneficiary, but the right re-
served in the insured to receive the periodic dividends on the policy without
the consent of the beneficiary. While the insured has no power of control over
the proceeds of the policy, yet he has a right to the income which only death
will terminate. Until the insured's death there is no "completion of the shift-
ing of the economic benefits" in the proceeds, which is the fundamental basis
of the tax. Moreover, the amount which the beneficiary would receive at the
insured's death would be increased if the latter were without the right to claim
the dividends. While the burden on the beneficiary would be heavier in a case
of this sort than it would be in the situations discussed above, yet, under the
language of the Chase case it appears rather certain that no distinction could
be made, and the amount of the policy in excess of $4o,oo0 would be included
in the gross estate of the decedent. 3
Where a policy expressly provides that the proceeds are payable to the
insured's estate on the contingency that one or more beneficiaries predecease
the insured, the proceeds will not be taxed where in the absence of this provision
they would be exempt." It is said that the interest of the insured is too remote
on which to base a tax. An additional reason might be that the operation of the
contingency does not depend on the will of the insured and to this extent at least
the provision is substantially different from the other rights which an insured
may reserve in the policy.
A legal relationship with which the Act does not specifically deal is that of
assignments of insurance policies. It is a common occurrence in insurance
transactions for the insured to assign his policies either to strangers or relatives,
for or without consideration. One court has expressly held that "assignees"
are not included among "all other beneficiaries" within the meaning of that
phrase as used in the statute.55 While it is admitted that there are accepted
differences between an assignment of a policy and the designation of a bene-
ficiary by the insured,", yet the recognition of such distinctions ought not to be
sufficient to make the proceeds exempt in one case and taxable in the other, if in
both instances substantially identical legal incidents result. If, in an assignment,
the insured has retained the privilege of recalling the transfer, and such privilege
remains with him until death, the amount realizable on the insured's death
should not be excluded from taxation. And this is the prevailing judicial
opinion,57 despite doubts raised in various quarters. 8  Since the right to revoke
Sampson v. United States, supra note 49.
See Surrey and Aronson, supra note 36, at 1363; Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 744.
No case has arisen in which this right alone was involved. In Matter of Voorhees,
supra note 7, the insured named a trustee as beneficiary, reserved the right to change the
beneficiary and receive the dividends. The court said such dividends were not "dividends"
in the sense of a return on property or an investment.
" Levy's Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 49; Phelps v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 648
(927) ; Ballard v. Helburn, supra note 43.
Guettel v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 613 (1929).
See Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 741 et seq.; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett,
222 Fed. 200, 205 (C. C. A. 6th, 19,5) ; 7 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 44, at 6443.
5 Ballinger v. Commissioner, supra note 49; Anthracite Trust Co. v. Phillips, 49 F. (2d)
91o (M. D. Pa. I93I) ; see Chase National Bank v. United States, supra note 41; cf. Levy's
Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 49.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 744-5.
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is similar to the right to change the beneficiary, the proceeds of such revocably
assigned policies are included in the gross estate of the insured, less the $40,000
exemption, for tax assessment.59 Where, however, the policy is irrevocably
assigned the relationship created is comparable to that arising where the insured
has reserved no right to change the beneficiary (or any of the other "operative"
rights). By the assignment the insured is divested of all right and beneficial
interest in the policy, and therefore no tax is assessed.60 Consistently with this,
it has been held recently that the proceeds are not taxable even where the
insured continues to pay the premiums subsequent to the irrevocable assign-
ment.6 1 Other provisions of the Revenue Act 02 deal adequately with the case
where the insured receives consideration from the assignee.
It has been assumed thus far that, where the insured has reserved none of
the above-mentioned operative rights in the policy, the proceeds thereof will
not be included in his gross estate for taxing purposes. In other words, where
the beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy prior to the insured's death
the proceeds are not taxable. A considerable number of decisions support this
conclusion.0 3  But the language of subsection (g) does not warrant it. In
terms, all insurance "taken out" by a person is taxable at his death, excepting,
of course, the $40,000 exemption. But grave constitutional doubts arise where
an attempt is made to give the fullest effect to the language used. Inasmuch
as the beneficiary has a vested right in such a policy, and since he must eventually
pay the tax which would vary with the size of the insured's estate, he may
invoke both the due process clause and the constitutional prohibition of a direct
tax which is unapportioned.64  It has been suggested that both of these argu-
ments might be overcome. 3 However, there remains another more formidable
obstacle which stands in the way of an imposition of the tax in this situation.
There is, in fact, no transfer by the insured at his death of any property interest
in the policy. No interest has terminated at death which has redounded to the
benefit of another. In the language of the Chase case, this is the basis of the
federal estate tax. That the courts and the Treasury Department have not been
unmindful of these difficulties is attested by their reluctance to apply subsection
(g) literally.06
' See cases cited supra note 57. In the Chase case, supra note 41, at 338, 49 Sup. Ct. at
128, Mr. Justice Stone said, ". . . the power to tax the privilege of transfer at death cannot
be controlled by the mere choice of the formalities which may attend the donor's bestowal of
benefits on another at death, or of the particular methods by which his purpose is effected, so
long as he retains control over those benefits with power to direct their future enjoyment until
his death."
' Blood's Est. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. IOOO (1931) ; Guettel v. United States, supra
note 55; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 7 F. (2d) 146 (W. D. Ky. 1925) ; Levy's
Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 49; Liebes v. Commissioner, supra note 41.
' Levy's Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 49.
' The income tax provisions of the Revenue Act would apply in this situation. UNITED
STATES TAX GUIDE (933) § 126; Note (1927) I CIN. L. REV. 467.
' Liebes v. Commissioner, supra note 41 ; Gaither v. Miles, supra note 29; Reed v. Com-
missioner, supra note 46; Anthracite Trust Co. v. Phillips, supra note 57; Ballard v. Hel-
burn, supra note 43; Blood's Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 6o; Levy's Est. v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 49; Jones v. Commissioner, supra note 34; Union Trust Co. v. McCaughn,
24 F. (2d) 459 (E. D. Pa. 1927).
" Surrey and Aronson, supra note 36, at 1363, 1364.
' Ibid.; Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 741-3.
0 See cases cited supra note 63. Originally the Treasury provided for the taxation of all
insurance irrespective of the retention of "legal incidents of ownership". U. S. Treas. Reg.
7o, Art. 27. But by T. D. 4296 (issued August 6, 193o) this was amended to provide that only
where "legal incidents of ownership" were reserved by insured could the government tax
life insurance payable to designated beneficiary. See 332 C. C. H. 3634; Morton, Taxabilij,
of Life Insurance (1931) 9 TAX MAGAZINE 205, 207; MONTCOMERY, op. cit. supra note 32,
at 757.
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It has been suggested 67 that the recent case of Burnet v. Wells, s involving
income tax, is applicable to the problem here involved. In that case an assured
created a funded irrevocable life insurance trust, the income of which was to
pay the premiums on insurance policies payable to the trustee for the use of
designated beneficiaries. The insured had retained none of the operative rights
in the policies. The Supreme Court held that such part of the income of the
trust as was used in the payment of premiums was to be included in the gross
income of the insured for taxing purposes. The Court rested its decision on
the fact that, by safeguarding the rights of the objects of his bounty by means
of the trust, the insured had a benefit in the income which was so substantial
that a tax could be imposed. It was found to be immaterial that the insured
had no legal rights to the income of the trust. While the opinion embodies
language broader than the Court heretofore has been willing to adopt, and while
it indicates a definite trend toward a more flexible application of taxing statutes,
yet it is difficult to perceive how in the assessment of estate taxes it can over-
come the want of a transfer at the insured's death. Having no operative right
in the policies, the insured at no time could have diverted the proceeds to someone
other than the named beneficiary. To tax such proceeds on the basis of a
testamentary transfer will require the use of more subtle distinctions than the
Court has yet been willing to employ.
An acute problem which subsection (g) raises is the interpretation to be
given the phrase "under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life".
The words "taken out" have an accepted meaning in insurance terminology,
viz., where the insured applies for the policy and pays the first premium on it. 9
Accordingly, the Treasury Department has ruled that the policies are subject
to tax where the insured, directly or indirectly, has paid the premiums, but that
the policies are exempt where all the premiums have been paid by the bene-
ficiary. 0  But it is immaterial if the insured has not applied for the insurance.,
The Treasury also has ruled that where the premiums are paid partly by the
beneficiary and partly by the insured, the policy is taxable to the extent of the
proceeds realizable from the payments by the insured.72  However, where a
corporation paid the premiums on a policy insuring the life of a majority share-
holder, a federal court held that there was no proportionate payment of pre-
miums by the insured to the extent of his interest in the corporation, and no tax
was imposed. 3 The court reasoned that in such a case the corporate entity
could not be disregarded. But where a corporation took out a policy on a
shareholder, paid the premiums for a number of years, then for an adequate
consideration transferred it to the insured who paid the subsequent premiums,
the Board of Tax Appeals upheld the assessment of a tax.
7 4
It will be noted that the Treasury's ruling excludes entirely the situation
where someone other than the insured or the beneficiary pays the premiums on
the policy. While, ordinarily, cases of this nature would not be common, yet
their existence may not be entirely precluded, especially if they provide havens
for tax avoidance. A husband might well insure his wife, pay the premiums,
have an object of his bounty designated a beneficiary, with operative rights
' Lowndes, The Constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 2o VA. L. REv. 141,
168-169.
6 289 U. S. 670, 53 Sup. Ct. 761 (1933) ; Note (933) 20 VA. L. REV. 1O4. Accord:
Cummins v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 728 (Ct. Cl. 1933) ; Thacher v. United States, 4 F.
Supp. 1O8 (Ct. Cl. 1933) ; Pillsbury v. Burnet, 67 F. (2d) 151 (Ct. App. D. C. 1933); see
DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685, 688, 53 Sup. Ct. 766, 767 (933).
Morton, supra note 66, at 238.
" U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 25; UNITED STATEs TAx GUIDE, supra note 32.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Wilson v. Crooks, supra note 27 (policies not "taken out" by insured).
Iglehart v. Commissioner, supra note 29 (policies "taken out" by insured).
LEGISLATION
reserved in the insured.'5 Or, he might create an irrevocable trust to pay the
premiums on policies on his own life with operative rights in the policy reserved
to himself."' Certainly, a logical construction of the statute, as interpreted by
the Treasury, impels the conclusion that the proceeds of such arrangements
cannot be made a part of the insured's gross estate for tax assessment. Did the
Treasury intend this result? It might be said that when the Treasury mentioned
only premiums paid by "beneficiaries" as giving rise to exemption, that it in-
tended subsection (g) to apply to the case where a third party paid the pre-
miums. But if this be the proper conclusion, why was it not specifically so
declared?
It is obvious that Congress did not contemplate such escapes from the
application of subsection (g). Looking to the broad language of the Supreme
Court in the Chase case, the gap might well be filled without doing any sub-
stantial violence to the language employed by Congress to express its will. The
Chase case has ruled that a transfer tax may be imposed legitimately where
death results in a shifting of economic benefits in property from an insured to
a beneficiary. It should not be material that a third party has paid the pre-
miums.7 7  The decisive factor should be whether on the insured's death the
beneficiary has acquired some additional property right which he might not have
acquired had the insured continued to live. It is the beneficiary who ultimately
must pay the tax.78  Moreover, it should not be difficult to reconcile this ap-
proach with the common acceptation of "taking out". The payment of pre-
miums by the third party might be construed as a gift to the insured, and the
payments considered as in fact made by the insured. In the irrevocable trust
illustration, Burnet v. Wells should serve as a conclusive precedent for holding
that the insured in fact paid the premiums. Moreover, courts are not restricted
to inflexible definitions of words when interpreting a taxing statute.7" Pertinent
dicta of adjudicated cases point to the position here taken as a possible solution
of the problem.s"
One of the perplexing problems involved in the taxability of ordinary
transfers under the Revenue Act is the effect to be given subsection (h), which
purports to impose a tax on transfers made prior or subsequent to the effective
date of the Act. Courts 81 and commentators 82 have expressed divergent views
on the applicability of this subsection to life insurance proceeds, the constitu-
tionality of the clause being the common point at issue. On analysis, however,
it would seem that this mooted question need not even be raised. Under the
present status of the law, subsection (h) cannot be applied to a policy payable
to the insured's estate which has been taken out prior to the effective date of
In Bromley v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1322, 1326 (1929), the relationship created
was somewhat similar. However, there the insurance was payable to the insured's estate
although there was the right reserved in the insured to change the beneficiary. The Court
said that the policies "were taken out by the decedent upon her own life and the proceeds"
were to be included in her gross estate.
"' This is substantially the set-up in Burnet v. Wells, supra note 68, except that here the
insured has operative rights (legal incidents of ownership) in the policies.
'See supra note 62. Where the beneficiary pays the premium, the transfer to him has
been made for a consideration and no problem is involved.
'44 STAT. 79 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1114 (928).
See supra note 59.
See Bromley v. Commissioner, supra note 75; Ballard v. Helburn, suIpra note 43. In
Sampson v. United States, supra note 49, the Court said at 99, "If the death terminated some
right, power, or interest of the deceased in the property", that is sufficient on which to base
a tax; cf. Morton, supra note 66.
,' Anthracite Trust Co. v. Phillips, supra note 57 (the Court said Congress did not intend
by subsection (h) to make subsection (g) retroactive) ; Wyeth v. Crooks, supra note 45; cf.
Feuerbacher's Est. v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 734 (1931) ; Heiner v. Grandin, slupra note
26; Will of Allis, supra note 18.
"' See Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 733-4; MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 32, at 757.
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the Act, inasmuch as such proceeds are taxable under subsection (g) itself.
Moreover, it can bear no reference to a policy payable to a beneficiary in which
the insured has retained until his death an operative right, for in this situation,
under the doctrine of the Chase case, subsection (g) imposes a tax irrespective
of the date when the policy was taken out. Finally, it can have no application
to the situation where, in a policy having a named beneficiary, the insured pos-
sesses at his death no operative right in the policy, inasmuch as the proceeds
thereof are not taxable under subsection (g) even where the policies have been
taken out subsequent to the effective date of the Revenue Act. It is an a fortiori
case where the policy has been taken out, and the beneficiary's right to the pro-
ceeds has vested, prior to the effective date of the Act. Inasmuch as revocable
and irrevocable assignments are comparable, respectively, to the latter two situa-
tions, no other relation involving different legal incidents can arise. It is ap-
parent, therefore, that the construction given by the courts and the Treasury
Department to subsection (g) has completely sterilized the operation of the
retroactive clause, subsection (h), and further discussion of it in the light of
life insurance can have at the most only academic interest.
A problem recurrent in the interpretation of all federal taxing acts is the
effect of the state law on collateral issues which determine the applicability of
the taxing statute.8 3 This is an especially bothersome problem in the field of
life insurance due, in the main, to the existence of state statutes which fix per-
sonal right: in the proceeds, in a manner peculiar to each jurisdiction. Inasmuch
as it is a rule that the law of the state fixes property rights,84 this, naturally,
serves as a serious impediment to the uniformity of application which a federal
act requires." Thus, it is found that if insurance is payable to the insured's
estate it is not taxable under the Federal Act if by the state law the proceeds do
not pass to the executor."' But, one court has refused to abide by the state rule
that a beneficiary named in a policy has a vested right therein, even though the
insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary.87 However, where
under the law of the state the insured could not obtain the cash surrender value
of the policies without the consent of the beneficiary, even though he had re-
served such a right, a federal court acquiesced and refused to impose a tax.8
But where the taxpayer has not sustained the burden of proving that proceeds
of insurance were community property, and only half was payable to the in-
sured's estate, courts will require the inclusion of the full amount in the gross
estate of the decedent for taxing purposes.8 9
It is obvious that the peculiarities of state law offer a serious deterrent to
a uniform application of a national tax statute. This has always been a problem.
Perhaps Burnet v. Harmel,90 which asserted that a state law may affect the
operation of a federal taxing act only when Congress expressly or by implica-
tion so provides, will help to serve as a solution of the problem. At any rate, it
signifies a bolder attitude on the part of the Supreme Court in attacking the
question.
H.T.
' See Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 39, 47.
Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 3d, 192o) ; Lederer v. Northern Trust Co.,
262 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 3d, 192o).
Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, i F. (2d) 987 (E. D. Pa. 1924).
80 Jones v. Commissioner; Appeal of Lucky, both supra note 34; cf. Merrill Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 970 (193o) (solvent estate not exempt where statute of Maine
provides that insurance could not be payable to insolvent estate).
' Sampson v. United States, supra note 49 (involving the Massachusetts rule enunciated
by Tyler v. Treasurer, supra note 5).
Levy's Est. v. Commissioner, supra note 49 (abiding by the law of New York).
Sanchez v. Bowers, 57 F. (2d) 324 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; Newman v. Commissioner,
supra note 43 (community property in Louisiana). Accord: Carroll's Est. v. Commissioner,
29 B. T. A. no. 3 (933).
"'287 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74 (932).
